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Abstract: Military intervention is a crucial tool used to compel nation states 
to abide by the principles of international law. The United Nations, through 
its Charter (Chapter VII) authorises the use of force by the UN and or 
regional organisations as a legitimate scheme of settling international 
disputes. A closer look on the majority of these interventions, however, shows 
that the conduct of the forces taking part in these interventions turn to violate 
some crucial principles of international law. Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 to 
the 1949 Geneva protocols provides for the regulations in terms of the 
conduct of forces in an armed conflict to minimise civilian carnage and 
injuries as well as damage on civilian objects. This paper assessed the 
effectiveness of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in cases of a military 
intervention. The study was a case study focusing on the experiences of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces that intervened in the 
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999. The study depended 
on secondary sources of information. The paper reveals that forces taking part 
in these operations normally harm civilian population and objects beyond 
reasonable proportion if they do not pay attention to the details on the ground.  
The paper then recommends that more should be done to uphold and adhere 
to the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter while ensuring that forces 
taking part in military interventions are parties to key international 
legislations that govern their conduct to prevent states from purposefully 
violate the law. 
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1. Introduction 
Sullivan and Koch [1] defines military interventions as referring to, “the use of armed forces that 
involves the official deployment of at least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air or naval) to 
attain immediate political objectives through action against a foreign adversary.” To this end, Chapter 
VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter authorises the use of force as an option for settling disputes. 
Resultantly, major powers and prestigious military alliances have utilised and at times abused the 
provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to intervene militarily in different cases world-over. Koch 
[1] alluded that between 1945 and 2003, Britain, China, France, Russia and the USA conducted a total 
of 126 military interventions. Of these, the USA was leading with a total of 35 followed by France 
which conducted 29.  
One such intervention occurred in 1999 between 24 March and 9 of June 1999 when NATO forces 
were in the FRY on a humanitarian military campaign. The campaign started following the 
intensification of the systematic cleansing of the ethnic Albanians by the Serbian military and police 
forces for nearly a decade since the self-proclamation of independence by the province of Kosovo 
from the FRY in 1998 [2]. The operation was initiated with 214 American aircraft and an additional 
130 aircraft from other NATO members [3, 4]. During the period, 13 of the 19 NATO members flew 
more than 38, 000 sorties [5, 6] and released 23 600 air munitions against over 900 targets [5]. More 
than 500 civilians died while around 6 000 others were injured [7].  
The province of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Serbia proper and Montenegro were the official targets 
that saw the bombing of air fields, air defence, emplacements; bridges; command, control and 
communication sites; and police and troops barracks [5]. The operation was only stopped on the 9th of 
June 1999 after NATO and FRY officials had concluded a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
under which the Serb’s police and paramilitary groups were to leave Kosovo while the NATO-led 
military force code-named Kosovo Force (KFOR) took control over Kosovo [6]. 
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was at the same point established to administer 
the territory with more than 20, 000 peacekeeping force being deployed under the provisions of the 
1999 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 [8]. 
During the bombing campaign, it can be argued, IHL was violated in many ways beyond the 
expectation of many. This is so because the number of civilians who died during this operation, can be 
regarded as being disproportional.  
This paper, thus, sought to assess the effectiveness of IHL in cases of military interventions by 
reflecting on the experiences of the FRY during this military intervention. To achieve this, the study 
focused on means and methods of warfare as well as the weaponry used by the NATO in this military 
intercourse to appreciate the extent to which NATO adhered to the principles of humanity in Kosovo.   
 
2. Conceptualising Military Interventions and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)  
The concepts making up the framework for this study were the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
and Military Intervention. McCoubrey [9] defines IHL as the “branch of the laws of armed conflict 
concerned about the protection of victims of armed conflicts.” The study acknowledged the general 
work of Hennri Dunant as well as the philosophical influence of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas 
to understanding the aims of the IHL in military interventions. Although the works of these 
philosophers covered a broader scope to include the jus ad bellum, and the jus in bello, IHL, as it was 
considered in this study, linked much with one of St Thomas Aquinas’ criteria for a Just War, 
“limitation of action to the satisfaction of the original cause without pursuit of excess” [9]. The 
research in this regard considered the aim of military intervention to assess the objectivity of the 
means and methods employed in war without focusing on the legality of the intervention.   
This study, therefore, included, from the Geneva Law point of view: the 1864 Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the field (ibid. 11); 1907, 1929 
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and the 1977 and 2005 Additional Protocols [10].  
On the part of the Hague law of the IHL, the study considered multilateral agreements such as the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg interdiction on the use of 
projectiles in war; the 1929 Geneva Convention upon Gaseous, Poisonous and asphyxiating Weapons; 
and the 1981 UN Convention on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons which are unpredictable to 
x-ray when logged in the body [9, 11]. 
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UN Charter and the use of force 
Akehurst [12] notes that states, as members of the UN are, according to Article 2(3) of the UN 
Charter, obliged to, “settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice, are not endangered”.  
 
Discrimination and Proportionality  
 Principle of discrimination 
Parties to a conflict are obliged to direct their operations against military objects and spare 
civilian population and civilian objects [13]. Military objects in this case are those objects 
which by nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to the military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at 
that time, offers a definite military advantage to the executing force (Article 52 of Additional 
Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva Convention).  
 Principle of proportionality 
Derivative injuries to the civilian population cannot be ruled out during a military operation 
but should be proportional. Article 57(2) (ii) and (iii) of the 1977 Geneva Convention oblige 
parties to a conflict to: 
 
take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with 
a view of avoiding, and in any event to minimising incidental loss of civilians 
and to refrain from deciding to launch an attack which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury, damage to civilian objects or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. 
 
 
3. General Experiences of Military Interventions  
Problems unfolding to IHL were covered extensively after the Cold War as there were multiple 
internal conflicts especially outside the mainland Europe and the United States of America (USA). 
Various researches have, in this regard, invested on issues as women’s rights, human rights, legality 
of military interventions, effect of the intervention on the regional peace and security among other 
issues.  
According to Wieruszewski [13], international law, traditionally, recognised the state as “bearers 
of rights and duties” in international relations. In that study, it was displayed that the Geneva 
Convention of 1864 as well as the Hague Peace Conference (HPC) of 1899 and 1907 recognised an 
individual as a beneficiary of state obligation (ibid). The research also shows that there is much 
specification on the position of the IHL with regard to an individual with particular reference to 
provisions such as Article III and IV of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of the 
prisoners of war and the civilian person respectively [11]. Although there are variations between this 
research and the works by Wieruszewski, the research brings to light a crucial revelation in the field 
of IHL where the victims of war, particularly the prisoners of war, finds it difficult to enjoy their 
rights such as the right to “…make request to the military authorities regarding the conditions of 
captivity” as provided for in Article 78 of the Geneva convention III of 1949 (ICRC 2012). This 
study, however, considered this aspect as well but looking at it in times of military intervention with 
reference to the NATO intervention in FRY in 1999.  
Mertus [12] in The Global Review of Ethno Politics, was particularly eager to obtain views of 
human rights activists in countries where interventions were effected. How had military intervention 
affected civil society? What role had local NGOs played before and after the arrival of foreign troops? 
Had intervention, in their view, been successful, and how did they measure successes? The report did 
not, however, assess the effectiveness of the IHL in cases of military intervention which, therefore, 
became the focus of this paper. 
Samantha [3] analysed the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” and its impact on women in 
recipient states, particularly with regard to sexual violence.  The work, which used the case of Kosovo 
following the NATO intervention of 1999, presents a challenge to the ‘feminist hawks’ who are 
affected by military interventions as they led to situations of methodical sexual violence. The research 
established that such an intervention would be counterproductive for women’s rights and, thus, 
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constitute a disproportionate response to sexual violence in terms of international law governing the 
use of force. Relatedly, Smith and Cuesta [8] assessed the role of peace keeping forces in the 
formation of human trafficking networks. The research which made reference of the experiences in 
Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone, shows that there is generally a sharp increase in human trafficking 
and sexual abuses during presence of foreign military. For instance, in the case of Kosovo, a total of 
114 peacekeepers were expelled by the UN after they were found guilty of paying for sex [8, 9]. 
To add on, Smith and Smith [3] note that in 2004, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo’s  
(UNMIK) Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (TPIU) made a total of 77 arrests, 
conducted 2,386 raids and assisted 48 victims of human trafficking. The presence of the peacekeeping 
forces have, therefore, in most parts of Bosnia and Kosovo been associated with the increase and 
proximity of brothels near the barracks. Human trafficking and sexual violence, therefore, became a 
renounced effect of foreign military presence in Kosovo. These issues informed the present research 
but not as core elements as this research concentrated on the direct implications of the NATO 
bombings on the humanitarian situation in the FRY.  
Amnesty International [2] assessed the effectiveness of the EU-led Rule of Law mission in the 
FRY (EULEX) in dealing with the challenge of impunity in FRY and noted that there was a lot that 
needed to be done in this regard as the majority of the Serb military forces, police, and paramilitary 
forces responsible for the war crimes against Kosovo Albanians were not brought to justice. During 
that period, Amnesty International [15] notes that impunity for crimes involving gender violence 
continued with only six cases of war crimes having been brought to court by 2002. The research 
focused on prosecution of perpetrators of violence in Kosovo but did not include the perpetrators of 
the NATO induced casualties during the military intervention, a critical aspect of this study.  
 
4. Methodology 
The study used a qualitative research design to find answers to the research questions. The focus was 
case specific focussing on the experiences of Kosovo as a province of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) during the NATO military intervention in 1999.  Information used in this study 
was obtained from international journals, conference reports, text books, newspapers and court 
rulings. The research utilised content and text analysis to classify the data obtained, thus, established 
sub headings under which related data was presented. The same was used to give a critical 
examination of the developments found to have occurred during the military intervention in FRY by 
NATO forces who participated in Operation Allied Forces (OAF).   
 
5. Discussion on the findings with regards to the effectiveness of International humanitarian 
law (IHL) and Operation Allied Force (OAF) 
In order to understand the conduct of NATO forces during OAF, this research, using content and text 
analysis clustered some of the attacks by NATO forces to examine the extent to which the 
intervention respected the principles of distinction and proportionality.  
 
An attack on Grdelica railroad bridge (12 April 1999); a bridge in Lužane (01 May 1999); and 
Varvarin bridge (30 May 1999). 
The incidents involved the attack on communication infrastructure making them, from a general 
perspective, some military objectives considering the definition of lawful targets that includes 
transportation (equipment, lines of communication, petroleum, oil, and other lubricants necessary for 
transport) (Fanrick 2001:494). Although some of these attacks may have been legal military targets, it 
is important to assess the extent to which the execution of the military attack in these cases did not 
result in the collateral damage exceeding the military advantage perused by the forces.  
The attack on the railroad bridge in question incidentally killed 10 civilians after the dual bombing 
incidents attacked a scheduled passenger train [5]. This was after the forces attacked the bridge, which 
was also used as a resupply route for Serb forces in Kosovo.  A similar attack occurred when NATO 
warplanes bombarded the Luzane Bridge during the midday of 1 May 1999. The bridge was a supply 
link between Nis (Serbia) and Pristina (Kosovo) [5]. AI (2000:46) notes the attack on the bridge 
resulted in a scheduled civilian bus being a spin-off of the incident and killed 40 people after the bus 
fell some 60 feet into the riverbank below. The continuation of the air strikes resulted in an ambulance 
rushing people to a hospital falling victim resulting in one of its medical crews being injured. On the 
30th of the same month, another similar attack occurred as the NATO forces attacked the Varvarian 
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Bridge in central Serbia at around 1pm. The incident which took place on a market and a religious 
holiday led to the death of 11 civilians and injure to 40 more civilians.  
In the preceding cases, it can be argued that OAF violated the principles of distinction and 
proportion by failing to consider a number of factors. All the attacks on immobile objects occurred 
during the day when civilian movement was very high. Again, there was evidence of attacks without 
guidance of military intelligence as indicated by the derivative attacks on scheduled civilian mobile 
objects such as the train, the bus and the ambulance. Conducting an attack in a busy market on a 
scheduled religious holiday was equally wrong and worsened the humanitarian situation in the area 
under study. Moore to this, NATO forces failed to give an effective warning as required by Article 
57(2) (c) of the Additional Protocol 1 of 1977. Giving such warning would, by no means, not 
jeopardise the effectiveness of the attacks considering that the Serbian authorities could never have 
moved the bridges in question.   
Had NATO carried out its preliminary investigations properly before executing these attacks, it 
can be argued that different timing could have been opted for only to reduce civilian carnage. Borch 
[5] notes that NATO argued that the FRY government officials were obliged, under Article 58(c) of 
the Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 to, “take necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military 
operations”. Failure by the FRY government to protect its civilian population cannot however be used 
as a justification for the attack on civilian population. 
The repeated attacks on civilian objects by NATO forces implies that the intervention failed to 
play its part the just way. For instance, when an F-15E Strike Eagle of the USA targeted the train at 
the Grdelica at the first time, the pilot and weapons system officer argued, according to Borch [5],  
that they only realised there was a train on the bridge when it was too late to stop the laser-guided 
bomb. That being reasonable, IHL provides that operation should be halted once it is realised that 
there are civilians at danger. The second strike by the pilot on the same target without proper 
verification, some few minutes later, shows that the pilot acted negligently by launching the second 
attack on the same target.  
Questionable, again, is the height from which NATO war planes were flying when the attacks were 
launched. Borch [5] shows that the pilot launched his first laser-guided bomb while still “many miles” 
from the target, from where he “was not able to put his eyes on the bridge.” It can be noted that the 
average altitude of 15 000 feet from which NATO pilots were flying from made it difficult for them to 
distinguish between military objectives and noncombatants and their property (ibid. 71). Article 57(2) 
(ii) and (iii) of the 1977 Additional Protocol oblige parties to a conflict to, “take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with view of avoiding, and in any event, 
minimising incidental loss of civilians.” In this regard, flying at that altitude, which later contributed 
to the increased death toll of the civilians, violated the provisions of laws of armed conflicts. 
Regrettably, NATO officials argued that the altitude was chosen so as to ensure the safety of the pilots 
by avoiding surface-to-air missiles [5]. 
 
 
Missile Attack on Serbian Radio and Television Station (Radio Televisija Srbije – RTS) 23 April 
1999 
NATO warplanes attacked the Serbian Radio and Television Station (RTS). Franrick [13] pointed at 
the intentional missile attack at midnight which killed between 10 and 17 civilians who included 
technicians, security and makeup artist while injuring almost a similar number of civilians. According 
to AI (2000:40), 120 civilians were in the building at the time of attack. This research obtained that 
the extent to which the RTS could be considered to be military object was questionable while at the 
same time the precaution given failed to match he expectations of IHL. According to Voon [7], 
NATO officially argue that the RTS was a legitimate target. NATO argued that, “the attack was 
carried out because RTS was a propaganda organ and that propaganda is direct support for military 
action” (AI 2000: 41).   
With regard to this attack, the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention (HCPC), one of the 
critical conventions regulating the conduct of forces in military interventions indicates that broadcast 
stations may be attacked while the ICRC in a list of military objectives included the installations of 
broadcasting and television stations provided that they are of fundamental importance [13]. 
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The term may, in the 1954 HCPC shows that the object is not an ultimate military objective but 
may at times be, depending on the situation. The term provided, as used by the ICRC may be 
interpreted to mean that this can only be attacked if it offers a military advantage.  Considering the 
RTS as a military objective on the basis of it being a propaganda tool can be considered as a baseless 
argument considering the situation prevailing at the time of the attack.  
The judgement given by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) which acquitted Hans Fritzsche, 
a senior official in the Propaganda Ministry of the 3rd Reich can be used to give clarity on this 
question. In this case, Franrick [13] noted that the tribunal held that the strong statements of 
propaganda made by Hans could not be held as a valid reason to consider him as having been a 
participant in the crimes charged as his aim was to arouse popular sentiments in support of Hitler and 
not the war. From this point, it can be argued that the RTS could not be considered as a legitimate 
military attack on ground of it being a propaganda tool for the Milosovic regime. Consequently, this 
research established that the attack on the RTS was, under IHL, a violation of law. The judgement by 
the IMT, again, in the Hans case, dovetail with the explanation given by the Committee of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTFRY) which 
cautioned that, 
 
“had the station gone beyond broadcasting propaganda and actually instructed 
listeners to kill Albanian Kosovars or engage in other crimes against humanity, it 
would have become a legitimate military objective” [5].  
 
Having said this, it can be argued, therefore, that the attack on RTS by NATO was a violation of 
the IHL principle of distinction as the operation intentionally targeted and attacked a civilian object 
which, according to Gaubatz [14], should be completely immune from the effects of military attack. 
The attack also violated the principle of proportionality as provided for in Article 57 (2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 by failing to give warning to civilians resulting the casualties caused by 
an intentional attack on an establishment with 120 civilians 
This research also obtained that the warning claimed to have been issued by NATO was not as 
effective as is required by International Law.  Firstly, the contradictions in the statements issued in the 
public media by the NATO prior to the attack on the 23rd of April are clear testimony of this 
ineffectiveness. AI [15] notes that on the 8th of April 1999, Air Commodore Wilby stated that NATO 
had considered RTS a military target as it was used for propaganda and repression. On the same day, 
General Jean Pierra Kelche, a French armed Force Chief said that NATO was going to, “burst the 
transmitters and relay stations” as they were considered instruments of propaganda of the Milosevic 
regime while on 9 April 1999, Jamie Shea, the NATO spokesperson announced that RTS was not 
among NATO’s military targets (ibid). 
Contradictory as it is, NATO surprisingly continued to claim that Belgrade’s failure to warn its 
civilian population following the warning given earlier on gives the Serbian government the 
responsibility for the death of the civilian population as provided for in Article 58 of the Additional 
Protocol 1. [5]). As indicated by AI [15], Eason Jordan, the president of CNN International confirmed 
to have received a warning of the attack well before and was advised to tell the CNN people to avoid 
the TRS. Although this has been used by NATO officials as evidence of an effective warning having 
been given concerning the attack, Voon [7] vetoed the validity of such warning arguing that: 
 
“If NATO warned CNN and or Yugoslav officials of the attack, it would still arguably 
fall short of its duty to give ‘effective’ advance warning. The effectiveness of the 
warning needs to be judged against whether civilians as a group are made aware of 
the attack, not just Western civilians.” 
 
This observation shows that NATO fell short of its duty to warn the civilians while at the same 
time the Serbian government can be held liable as it failed to uphold the provisions of Article 58 of 
1977 Additional Protocol 1 considering the fact that something was said pertaining to the attack of the 
RTS by NATO and nothing was done by the Serbian government to protect the Serbian civilian 
population.  
Article 52(2) of the 1997 Additional Protocol 1 provides that a military attack should give a 
military advantage to the attacker if the attacked object is really a military objective. The military 
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advantage gained by NATO following the attack on the RTS, thus, becomes a subject of interest. 
Authorities such as Bosch [1], Voon [7] and Amnesty International [15] cordially argues that the 
attack did not give any military advantage required by Article 52 of the Additional Protocol 1 of 1997 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions as few hours following the attack and the death of so many civilians, 
the facility was back to operation.  Surprisingly, NATO forces did not re-attack the facility. In short, it 
can be argued that the attack on the RTS shows that both the NATO forces as well as the FRY failed 
to uphold the provisions of the Geneva protocols governing the conduct of hostilities. This therefore 
shows clearly the extent to which these laws of humanity are violated in cases of military intervention. 
 
Market and Hospital attack at Nis (07 May 1999) 
According to Amnesty International [15], the attacks occurred around mid-day and consist of 
dropping of cluster bombs in two residential areas of Nis leading to the death of 14 and injure of 30 
civilians. NATO argued that this was an incidental loss occurring after the NATO forces misfired and 
missed its target of the nearby air field.  
Although the use of cluster bombs is not prohibited under International Law, Article 51(4) and 
section (5) of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention of 1977 prohibit indiscriminate attacks.  
The use of this weapon, therefore, shows clearly that NATO forces failed to take measures to spare 
civilians by taking feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid or 
minimise loss of civilian life and refraining from deciding to launch an attack which may cause 
incidental loss of civilian life as provided for in this Article. Amnesty International [12] notes that 
NATO admitted that cluster bombs should be used in aerial targets where it should be known that 
offshoot damage would not occur. Considering the devastating effects of cluster bombs, it become 
difficult to uphold the principles of distinction when the bomb is used in or near a populated area. The 
attack on the Korisa village seven days later clearly shows such an effect as 87 civilians lost their 
lives as outgrowth damage following the dropping of 10 cluster bombs over the village by NATO [7]. 
The principle of distinctions as provided for in Article 51(8) of the Additional Protocol of 1977 
requires that a party to a conflict do give due warning to civilians likely to be harmed by a military 
attack on a military object. In light of this, the attack on the hospital and a market place at Nis can 
arguably be considered as having been launched without this consideration. Firstly, the attack 
occurred during the day when civilian traffic was at peak in the streets. This was after the people had 
left their bomb cover following a bombing on the air fields which occurred around 0300hs on the 
same day [15]. Perhaps, as indicated by Lustgarten and Debrix [16], the conduct of NATO forces in 
this operation testifies to the argument that forces involved in military interventions sometimes act as 
if they are beyond the reach of IHL.  
In short, it can argued that, of the numerous attacks by NATO during its bombing campaign, the 
force violated laws regulating the conduct of war. The reason for this argument is, as shown above, 
the conduct of NATO forces with regard to their interpretation of the law, the means and methods 
used to select targets, the rules of engagement, precautionary measures taken, the use of specific 
weapons and the intelligence as it was used to ensure the respect of the principle of distinction. The 
cases selected and discussed above are just but a drop out of the pool of related cases in which the 
violations occurred.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Military interventions, in most cases result in the violation of humanitarian provisions of the 
international law. Parties taking part in interventions are usually overcrowded by obligations but 
finally conduct themselves in any possible way to supress the intended enemy without much 
consideration of the by-product effect of their conduct. Legal provisions of international law requiring 
for forces to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality are at times difficult to honour 
during a battle as this may also give advantage to the contesting force.  
 
7. Recommendation 
Having looked at various aspects of the International Humanitarian law with particular attention on 
the conduct of the NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this paper suggest the 
following recommendations:  
 Parties to every conflict should resorting to peaceful settlement of conflicts as there is no 
guarantee of civilian safety in military interactions to both the winner and the loser. 
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Additionally, the study also recommends for the authorisation for the use of force by the 
UNSC and is therefore against the decentralisation of such power to allied forces or regional 
organisations. This argument is based upon a number of factors including the idea that these  
allied forces or regional organisation have, in most cases, failed to consider the principles of 
the Jus ad bellom which may be the reason why they fail again to uphold the subsequent Jus 
in bellom which is the issue at hand;  
 Parties taking party in military intervention should do so with a clear mandate. From this, it 
can be argued that had the UNSC passed a resolution before this attack, the issues of 
distinction might have been discussed from a legal point of view with the humanitarian 
concern only to reduce the death toll in form of collateral damage. UNSCR 1244 was only 
passed after OAF.  
 This paper also recommends that there be more legal frameworks that guide military 
interventions. Although there are a number of international conventions as well as bilateral 
and multilateral treaties providing for the laws regulating the conduct of war, it is 
fundamental to note that the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 is the chief on the list. Surprisingly 
the USA, whose aircraft flew nearly 80 per cent of NATO strike-attack sorties during the 
campaign, had not ratified the Protocol during OAF. As such, it became difficult to identify 
the standard of international law which was observed or respected by the member states 
participating in this bombing campaign [15].  
 The adherence to the laws of Geneva by the members of the NATO forces become highly 
questionable as it appear that the main members of the force do not share a common treaty 
obligation. From this point of view, it can be argued that the death of the civilian population 
was exaggerated by the problem that some of these nations did not recognize the provisions of 
the Additional Protocol 1 of 1977. Voon [7] alludes that NATO must learn from the civilian 
losses that it imposed in the Kosovo conflict by ensuring that, “all of its member states accede 
to the Additional Protocol 1.” For this reason, the study recommends that for the UN to work 
hard, through its specialized agencies as well as independent international organizations to 
lobby for the ratification of the laws regulating the conduct of hostilities not only by NATO 
members but by all other nations of the world. This, the study believes; will enhance the 
upholding of such rules, laws and regulations in times of military conflicts. 
 Furthermore, a lot need to be done with regard to the aspect of observing the laws available to 
govern international military action. For example, it is so disappointing to note that UK, 
regardless of it having ascended to the Additional Protocol 1 of 1977, continued to drop RBL 
755 cluster bombs for nearly a month regardless of the condemnation of the condition under 
which the weapon was being used [15]. Offenders in this regard should therefore never be let 
off the hook as what happened to the NATO forces as this may have a ripple effect and 
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